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"Safe Streets, Inc.: The 'Hustle' to End Black Gang Violence in Philadelphia, 1969-1976"
Abstract:
From 1962 to 1968, gang stabbings and murders in Philadelphia drastically increased, inspiring
Philadelphia District Attorney Arlen Specter (from 1965-1973) to establish Safe Streets, Inc. in
August 1969 as a non-profit, anti-gang program designed to reduce gang violence, end turf wars
between rival gangs, and provide social services like job training and academic tutoring to
juveniles. Since the program came into existence amidst the Civil Rights Movement (19541968), numerous cases of police brutality, and over 200 race riots in post-industrial cities, the
yearly Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) grant from the federal government
offered to cities under the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 became
appealing to liberal and conservative politicians alike. Many conservative city officials often
conflated civil rights protestors, rioters, social activists, and gang members into a single entity
that was a constant nuisance to the police. Additionally, President Lyndon B. Johnson’s
proposition of the Great Society programs, War on Poverty and War on Crime, led liberals and
conservatives to debate on how to reduce crime with the LEAA grant. Conservatives argued
police departments should receive the LEAA grant to spend on strengthening its crime-fighting
methods. Conversely, liberals lobbied for the funds to finance local social uplift programs that
would gradually rectify the issue of urban poverty and effectively reduce crime. Although the
Civil Rights Acts of 1964, 1965, and 1968 federally enforced desegregation and equal
opportunity employment, voting, and housing respectively, several conservative politicians like
Mayor Frank L. Rizzo (from 1972-1980) refused to believed that curing the social ills of poverty,
unemployment, and school dropouts would result in massive crime reduction in major cities like
Philadelphia. From 1969 to 1976, Specter competed with Mayor Frank Rizzo for funding to
rehabilitate youth at Safe Streets’ centers in the predominantly black neighborhoods of North and
West Philadelphia while Rizzo proposed to utilize the grant to strengthen crime-fighting
techniques within the police department. Nevertheless, the battle over federal funding between
liberal and conservative politicians influenced police-community relations in the 1970s when
violence between police and citizens in Philadelphia was at its highest in forty years.
Word Count: 348 words
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Introduction
On the warm Friday afternoon of August 10, 2018, I made a trek to the neighborhood of
Sharswood looking for 2201 W. Stewart Street, the location of one of the 1970s Safe Streets, Inc.
centers promoting anti-gang activity, as a research tactic that my cultured colleagues at Temple
refer to as “flâneuring.”1 By going to the site of the former facility, I hoped to gain a geographic
and emotional understanding of the neighborhood where this anti-gang program existed. I
wanted to not only be connected to the research, but also acquire insight into how this program
functioned in this neighborhood when it was active. More importantly, I wanted to know if Safe
Streets left a lasting impact on the neighborhood after it shuttered its doors.
The next day, I felt ambitious and explored the Cobbs Creek neighborhood surrounding 249
S. 60 Street, the location of the second Safe Streets center. I went to these locations alone, on
th

foot, in the heat and rain, and unknowingly through gang territory. At these locations in North
and West Philadelphia respectively, I found desolation, poverty, boarded up buildings, and
housing projects, but also well-kept homes, murals, revitalization projects under construction,
and major landmarks—remnants of the demolished and infamous Blumberg Housing Projects,
the Moderne-Art Deco styled Vaux High School, and the Free Library dedicated to 1960s civil
rights activist Cecil B. Moore. However, my overall impression and feeling while being in these
neighborhoods was one of isolation, abandonment, fear, angst, and vulnerability.
When I started working on this project, I was investigating how politicians, community
residents, and police officers attempted to solve tensions between police and the black
community with social programs in 1970s Philadelphia. From 1970-1978, there were 469 police-
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involved shootings in which 66% of all suspects shot were black, even though African
Americans comprised 33% of Philadelphia’s population.2 In the 1970s, seventeen officers died
by gunfire, assault, and stabbing. Philadelphia had not experienced such a deadly decade for
police since the 1920s when 27 officers were murdered at the hands of criminal suspects.3 In
several of these 1970s police homicide cases, African American suspects killed white police
officers as a response to black citizen-white police confrontations they believed to be police
brutality.
In my efforts to investigate how Philadelphians sought to solve this issue of violence between
young black male citizens and police officers, I discovered the program Safe Streets, that
Philadelphia District Attorney Arlen Specter (from 1965-1973) founded in Delaware in Spring
1969 as a nonprofit organization designed to “encourage gangs into constructive programs.”4
However, as I researched Safe Streets at Temple University’s Special Collections Archives, I
kept asking myself, how this anti-gang program is related to the issue of racial tension and
violence between police and black citizens? The answer to this question turned out to be more
complicated than I imagined it would be.
Gangs have existed in Philadelphia as early as 1836.5 In the nineteenth century, citizens
living, working, or travelling through gang territory often faced the possibility of experiencing
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street crime that consisted of pickpocketing, armed robberies, “smash-and-grab robberies in local
stores and marketplaces,” pocket watch stealing, or getting caught in the middle of a “bloody
rumble” between rival gangs.6 In gang-active communities, these organizations survived
economically through the operation of illegal activities such as alcohol and drug sales, gambling,
racketeering, and prostitution.7 For individuals who willingly joined these organizations, gangs
provided a sense of belonging, protection from neighborhood outsiders and police, and income to
members, especially during periods of economic downturns in American society.8
Street gangs like the Schuylkill Rangers (active for 25 years in the mid-1800s), motorcycle
gangs like the Ramblers, organized crime syndicates like Philadelphia’s Italian Mafia and the
like have all functioned in marginalized and disadvantaged communities, often because of
societal stigmas based on ethnicity, class, or immigration status.9 From the nineteenth to early
twentieth century, gangs were most notably present and policed in working-class, Irish, African
American, and immigrant communities in Philadelphia. These were the same groups that often
faced housing discrimination where the only affordable homes available to them were located in
“undesirable” locations near dockyards, rivers, and swampland. Joblessness, meager
employment opportunities (e.g., domestic, bricklayer, or railroad builder), and segregated and
underprivileged schools and public facilities kept many individuals from these communities in
poverty for generations.10 Interestingly, several gangs in the nineteenth century provided some
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beneficence to their communities, such as assisting volunteer fire companies in gaining access to
water supplies and forcefully encouraging residents to vote in elections. In the twentieth century,
North Philadelphia youth gangs active between 1963 and 1965 stood alongside church women’s
groups, black-led trade unions, and the National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People (NAACP) to protest segregation at the private all-white high school, Girard College.11
However, their criminal activities overshadowed their good deeds and encouraged police and the
city to map out their locations of operation, raid their hangouts, and arrest and imprison them in
facilities like Eastern State Penitentiary for breaking the law.12
By 1947, Philadelphia police officers, under the initiative of Sergeant August “Gus”
Rangnow (1892-1972), established the Police Athletic League (PAL) following World War II to
deter youth of underprivileged communities from engaging in street crime and drug use.13 By the
1960s, there were nineteen PAL centers throughout the city offering free after-school programs
for tens of thousands of children from ages six to eighteen. The main goal of PAL centers was to
connect police officers with neighborhood children via mentorship, friendship, and
sportsmanship in athletic games of boxing, baseball, basketball, table tennis, and marching
band.14 As police commissioner (from 1968-1972), Frank L. Rizzo visited prisons and
participated in multiple PAL events like “Commissioner for a Day” in which he gave teenagers
assignments at police headquarters.15 As mayor (from 1972-1980), Rizzo continued his selective
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involvement in crime prevention by not only signing autographs for children and assisting police
at crime scenes, but also promoting American patriotism at PAL centers. Officers, coaches, and
mentors (assigned by Rizzo) at PAL centers encouraged children to say the pledge of allegiance
and sign oaths of allegiance that were sent to Mayor Rizzo and other state and national
politicians.16 Furthermore, PAL centers not only used recreation to steer children from crime, but
also indoctrinate them into being loyal citizens.
As gang activity and violence persisted into the late twentieth century, racial tension between
white police and the black community coexisted along with it as early as the late 1800s.
Following the First and Second Great Migrations of 6.6 million African Americans (from 1916
to 1970) from Southern states to Northern industrial cities like Philadelphia, 1940s racial tension
between white police and black citizens originated in integrating neighborhoods where unpoliced
white racism and violence provoked racial conflict between average whites and blacks.17 In the
1950s, job flight and white flight to the suburbs left communities economically and racially
imbalanced, which inevitably frayed positive relationships forged in schools, residential
neighborhoods, and the workplace.18 In the 1960s, when the United States witnessed peaceful
protests as the Civil Rights Movement was undertaken through social and legal channels, there
were numerous incidents of police brutality against African American peaceful protestors and
criminal suspects that sparked a nationwide outbreak of over 200 race riots in several major U.S.
cities.19 Locally, the 1964 Columbia Avenue Riots in North Philadelphia--stirred by the false
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rumor that a white policeman beat a pregnant black woman to death--indefinitely etched racial
tension between black citizens and police. During the two-day riot, approximately 1,800 officers
were called to stop the uprising after African American residents burned cars, destroyed and
looted more than two hundred white businesses, and fought with police.20
Amidst this period of social unrest, many conservative city officials often conflated civil
rights protestors, rioters, social activists, and gang members into a single entity that was a
constant nuisance to the police. Police soon became militarized and schools, housing projects,
streets, and mass transportation inhabited by African Americans became criminalized.21
Additionally, President Lyndon B. Johnson’s proposition of the Great Society programs, War on
Poverty and War on Crime, led liberals and conservatives to debate how to reduce crime with the
Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) grant the federal government offered to
cities under the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. In the first fiscal year of
the LEAA, the federal agency received $59 million from the national budget. In 1970, the
LEAA’s budget was raised to $268 million and by July 1st, President Richard M. Nixon
requested that U.S. Congress allot $480 million for the agency.22
Each year, the LEAA offered grants to states desiring to curb crime through policing and or
social programs. Each state dispensed funds to localities following an application and evaluation
process. During the fiscal year of 1970, LEAA granted California $17.3 million, New York
received $16.4 million, and Pennsylvania got $11.5 million to implement anti-crime planning
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and social programs.23 Conservatives argued police departments should receive the LEAA grant
to spend on strengthening its crime-fighting methods. Conversely, liberals lobbied for the funds
to finance local social uplift programs that would gradually rectify the issue of urban poverty and
effectively reduce crime.24 Although the Civil Rights Acts of 1964, 1965, and 1968 federally
enforced desegregation and equal opportunity employment, voting, and housing respectively,
several conservative politicians like Mayor Frank L. Rizzo refused to believed that curing the
social ills of poverty, unemployment, school dropouts, and gang violence would result in
massive crime reduction in major cities like Philadelphia.
The Formation of Safe Streets, Inc.
In the late 1960s, gang violence gradually became a serious issue in Philadelphia. From 1962
to 1968, gang-related homicides per year jumped from one to thirty.25 In 1969 alone, there were
45 gang-related murders, 267 gang-related injuries, and numerous incidents of “burglary and
purse snatching” that affected gang members and innocent bystanders, including children.26 In
July 1969, the Pennsylvania Crime Commission released their report on gang violence in
Philadelphia stating there were currently 75 active, sporadic, or dormant gangs (each comprised
of black, white, or Puerto Rican members), 3,000 gang members known by police, and each gang
consisted of 25-250 members ranging from ages 12 to 23 years old. About 84% of gang
members were aged sixteen or older.27 In that same year, the Philadelphia Police Department’s
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Gang Control Unit reported that approximately 20% of the individuals shot, stabbed, or beaten as
a result of gang violence were civilians unaffiliated with a gang.28
Similar to previous generations, gang participation among youth and young adults occurred
because they sought a place where they belonged, protection from neighborhood rivals and
police, and income to improve their impoverished lifestyles. Depending on the gang, boys and
young men were inducted into the organization if they voiced their desire to be a member,
proved their potential by stealing a designated item, or fought one or more gang members. In a
May 1969 interview with a reporter from the Philadelphia Evening Bulletin, one gang member
described his induction process as: “You have to fight about ten guys to join. You don't have to
beat them all up, but you must show that you can defend yourself and that you have guts."29 In
other cases, the initiation process was simpler if the individual was related to a current gang
member or possessed a gun. It was a rare occurrence for individuals to be “drafted” or forced to
join a gang against their will. According to Police Sergeant Joseph E. Rich, supervisor of the
Gang Control Unit, the only time youth were coerced to join was when a gang was lacking
“troops” in the middle of “warfare” with a rival: "The only time a kid is drafted into a gang is
when the gang is over-extended militarily--that is, fighting two or three fights at once. The
‘runners’ [leaders of the gang] are pretty smart; they know that draftees don't make such good
fighters."30
Once in the gang, members were organized into different levels: the “Old Heads” (members
aged 18-23), the "Young Boys" (sometimes broken into two sub-levels, "Juniors" and "Seniors,”
but are between the ages of 14-17), the "Midgets" (ages 12-14 years old), and recruits in waiting
28

Ibid, 20.
Ibid, 20-25.
30
Ibid.
29

10

known as "Pygmies" or "Swiggetts" (aged 12 years old and younger).31 Among the “Old Heads,”
the “runner” or “warlord” was the leader of the gang. Some gangs had a “runner” who held total
responsibility for the gang and a “warlord” who was in charge of “military” affairs. The “second
runner” was next in command when the “runner” was not present. Lastly, the “checkholder” was
responsible for overseeing the lowest rank of gang members, the “corner boys,” and reporting the
activity of those “troops” to the “runners.”32
The names gang members selected to identify their groups were based on the neighborhood
of their headquarters or defined by one or more of their group’s personal characteristics. For
example, the 8th and Diamond Streeters referred to the intersection where they lived and
occupied, Zulu Nation reflected the gang’s racial pride in being black, and the Moon Gang
signified how gang members were “active” when the moon appeared at night. In times of
“warfare” or “protection,” gangs carried a multitude of weapons: rods, shotguns, pistols, zip guns
(a makeshift “gun” made of pipe, a block of wood, rubber bands, friction tape, and a door latch),
switch blades, razors, car aerials, chains, pipes, and leather straps.33 Guns acquired for a gang
were often illegally purchased in their neighborhood or legally purchased by gang members
eighteen years old or older. In Philadelphia, there were no well-established gangs comprised of
girls and young women. However, the girlfriends of gang members at times participated in gang
activities such as spying on rivals, carrying weapons, or fighting a girl affiliated with another
gang.34
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As gang violence increased, politicians began to publicly voice their concerns, namely Mayor
James H.J. Tate (from 1962-1972) who was quoted in 1969 by the New York Times saying,
“gang violence is giving Philadelphia a bad name.”35 Ironically, in the year prior to Tate’s press
statement, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) reported that out of ten major cities in the
nation, Philadelphia had the lowest rates in major crimes such as rapes, aggravated assaults,
larcenies, and car theft. To Philadelphians aware of gang violence in the city, speculation arose
as to where and how the FBI got their data to make such claims. In 1968, critics suspected the
crime data was flawed because it ignored the anti-crime work of community activists and the fact
that Police Commissioner Rizzo’s “tough on crime” approach may have been the reason for
crime reduction in certain situations.36
Since the 1950s, the Philadelphia Police Department came under scrutiny for numerous
charges of police brutality when the department pursued a “pro crime fighter” stance that
consisted of less emphasis on “emergency services and maintaining order” and more focus on
“serious crimes” like rape, murder, robbery, and burglary. As a result, police officers carried out
this order by “relying on motorized patrol, rapidly responding to calls for services, and using
forensic science to investigate crimes.”37 This focus on “serious crimes” often resulted in
excessive force because forcible felonies permitted police to invoke legal deadly force against a
suspect when an individual’s life was threatened.38 Additionally, discriminatory policing led to
the overrepresentation of African Americans in prisons and their underrepresentation in law
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enforcement. On January 10, 1950, the Philadelphia Tribune published an article stating that
40% of the city’s prison population was African American, even though black people were only
18% of Philadelphia’s population.39
Under Police Commissioner Howard Leary (1962–1965), he sought to improve policecommunity relations through organizations like the Police Advisory Board (PAB) as an effort to
reduce crime. When the 1964 Columbia Avenue Riots occurred under his watch, he ordered
police officers (including Deputy Commissioner Rizzo) to stand down and not pursue rioters and
looters.40 Instead, Leary permitted local church, civil rights, and community leaders to meet with
residents and arrange forums where police and citizens could discuss the racially-charged issues
that sparked the riot.41
In the late 1960s, Rizzo rose to the rank of police commissioner by implementing
discriminatory policing tactics that involved excessive force and civil rights violations against
“objectionable people” who did not fit the mold of what a true patriotic (white) law-abiding
citizen was: nonwhite, poor, homosexual, hippie, liberal, or political dissident.42 To Rizzo, these
“objectionable people” were the catalysts for immorality, street crime, and blight in Philadelphia.
As an Italian (seeking white solidarity in an ethnically-biased political sphere), conservative,
anti-crime advocate, Rizzo aligned himself with the city’s growing “law and order” constituency
and remained tough on crime. Furthermore, it was common for activists like Spencer Coxe, the
Executive Director of the American Civil Liberties Union’s (ACLU) Philadelphia Branch, to
receive numerous complaints of Police Captain Rizzo ordering the illegal raids of coffee houses,
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public squares, and political offices to disperse “undesirable” people who would offend his “law
and order” constituency.43
When Rizzo became police commissioner in April 1967, he not only installed the strict
policies of “stop and frisk” and emergency curfews, but also attempted to bolster the police
department by purchasing armored personnel transports that his critics likened to “military
tanks.” Additionally, Rizzo was not a supporter of the PAB, thought police brutality was rare and
required no departmental investigation of misconduct (despite many complaints from civil rights
organizations), and if there was a riot it was to be “treated with a firm hand.”44 Nevertheless, as
handgun purchases (legal and illegal) and juvenile crime rose nationally, Philadelphia’s city
officials soon became preoccupied with the rapid increase in gang violence and sought to take
action in 1969.
In 1968, the Pennsylvania Crime Commission reported there were approximately 14,000
juvenile arrests and 83,000 gang members in Philadelphia with “core” gang members being
repeat offenders of violent crime.45 In Summer 1968, a series of incidents in North Philadelphia
encouraged community residents and politicians to invest in a program to end gang violence.
After new spread that a boy was shot and killed in a gang fight and gang rivals, Zulu Nation and
the 8th and Diamond Streeters had declared war, Yorktown residents sent a message to the
District Attorney’s Office asking for help. On Independence Day, residents and staff from the
DA’s Office met with leaders of both gangs on a North Philadelphia street corner to end the
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violence. Following this series of incidents, politicians became more interested in finding a
remedial solution outside of policing to address gang activity in the city.46
Taking into consideration the statistics on gang violence, advice from Family Court Judge
Paul A. Dandridge, and community pleas for solutions, Philadelphia DA Arlen Specter contacted
President Richard M. Nixon to propose his project, Safe Streets, Inc. President Nixon responded
with the suggestion that Specter apply for an LEAA grant to fund the non-profit organization.
Specter applied for an LEAA grant in May 1968 to fund the pilot, anti-gang program designed to
lower the rate of teenage gang homicides and “encourage gangs into constructive programs.”47
In the LEAA application, Specter stated “gang violence has reached proportions which threaten
the entire law enforcement process of the community,” to highlight the urgency of a program that
would curb gang violence and juvenile delinquency in the city. Among the proposed activities
Specter pitched was four-day retreats at hostels or in rural settings where gang members could
gain free counseling from group therapists, an idea inspired by the New York City drug addiction
treatment organization, Daytop Village founded in 1963 by psychiatrist Daniel Casriel and
Roman Catholic priest Monsignor William B. O’Brien.48
In Spring 1969, Specter formally established the organization to lower juvenile delinquency
and crime, while also ensuring there was proper procedural action in criminal cases. By June
1969, Safe Streets received a $80,267 LEAA grant for youth gang control in North Central and
West Philadelphia.49 The LEAA program granted $215 million to state and local governments to
improve police forces, the courts, and correction systems. One of the conditions for LEAA-
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approved organizations was state and local agencies had to fund between 40-50% of the
organization’s budget. If an LEAA-approved organization did not meet local and state standards,
those agencies could deny it funding. The Pennsylvania Crime Commission disbursed
discretionary funding to Safe Streets approximately every six months. As a federally-approved
organization, Safe Streets received a list of priorities from the local government, but its LEAA
grant status could not be revoked by local or state agencies when it did not meet its goals. In
1969, approximately 75% of Safe Streets’ funding came from the LEAA grant, while the
remaining 25% ($25,000) came from a grant given by affiliates of the Greater Philadelphia
Movement.50
In August 1969, Safe Streets was in operation with a mixture of politicians, police officers,
and community activists from the neighborhood surrounding the two centers. At each center,
there was a unit director who planned and supervised activities, an assistant director who worked
directly with gangs on the street, eight youth workers who worked with gang members, two
teachers for tutoring, and a community organizer who facilitated parental and community
support for the center’s activities.51 In 1969, the organization’s board consisted of: Specter as the
program chairman; Police Detective Heywood Matthews as executive director; Clarence Fowler
as unit director of the North Philadelphia center; Assistant District Attorney Walter W. Cohen as
the project administrator of federal funds; and Assistants Dave Johnson and Bernard Rhodes.
The staff at Safe Streets were often men like Bennie Swans, a former gang member turned
community activist, who were paid to facilitate recreational and community service activities
with youth in and or vulnerable to gang activity near its two locations.52
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From its inception, the mission of Safe Streets was to be a “one-stop juvenile center” where
police officers, former gang members, and community activists worked together to teach at-risk
teenagers “responsibility and concern for themselves and society.”53 North and West
Philadelphia were chosen as locations for the centers because gang activity was most entrenched
in those poor and working-class, black neighborhoods.54 In its early stages, Safe Streets saw 35
to 50 juveniles enter each center daily with youth workers attempting to develop one-on-one
relationships with attendees. Among the activities offered to hundreds of teenaged visitors were
academic tutoring, job training, neighborhood cleanup projects, sports, newspaper writing, and
publishing. Since many youth who were “directed” to the centers were “troubled,” lived
disadvantaged lives, and or faced inequality in schools, housing, and employment, Safe Streets
provided group therapy sessions (facilitated by residents from the North Philadelphia drug
treatment center, Gaudenzia House) and annual trips to the theater and the Poconos to
rehabilitate and provide positive recreation for attendees. According to Specter, events like the
four-day retreat to the Poconos for 100 boys during the Summer was a great opportunity to
reduce gang violence and end turf wars between rival gangs.55
The same year Safe Streets was established, the Philadelphia Police Department received a
LEAA grant of $19,733 for creating a closed-circuit television system linking the city’s police
districts. Additionally, with Rizzo as police commissioner, violence between black males and
white police officers began to spike with the use of police policies and procedures of stop and
frisk, quotidian surveillance, illegal house raids, public strip searches, false criminal accusations
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and arrests, and verbal and physical assaults on suspects, average law-abiding citizens, political
activists, and protestors at peaceful demonstrations.56 Furthermore, Safe Streets, along with other
local Great Society programs like Start Towards Eliminating Past Setbacks (STEPS) and
Philadelphia’s Leaders of Tomorrow (PLOT) became a crucial response to crime where local
politicians and community activists made multiple efforts to eradicate gang activity and policecommunity tension.57 Even community and civil rights organizations like the North City
Congress (NCC) and the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) attempted to curb gang activity
and juvenile delinquency by arranging truce meetings between major North Philadelphia gangs,
citizens, and police.58 Unfortunately, politicians like Mayor Tate doubted these social programs
would lead to major crime reduction. In 1969, the Tate Administration attempted to persuade the
federal government to allocate only $44,000 to Specter’s program and give the Philadelphia
Police Department $56,000 for crime-fighting initiatives.59 Moreover, this was the beginning of a
long-term battle between liberals and conservatives over how federal funding would be
distributed and spent to combat juvenile delinquency, crime, and rioting.
Specter vs. Rizzo: The Fight for LEAA Grant Funding
In 1970, the high-stakes efforts to reduce gang activity on a shoestring budget became public
knowledge when Philadelphia Inquirer journalists William J. Speer and Tom Ferrick reported on
their visits to Safe Streets’ North Philadelphia center in February and July respectively of that
year. When Speer arrived at 2201 W. Stewart Street, he saw a three-story, six room storefront
that looked like a “neglected 50-year-old building with a swift paint job.”60 He described Safe
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Streets as an “experimental program” open six days a week from 9 AM to 9 PM where juveniles
received help with “scholastic and job difficulties” and rival gangs could “rap out” their
differences in intense group therapy instead of resorting to violence with “pipes, cleavers, knives,
and guns.”61 For the girls who attended the center, there were “local women” who taught them
homecrafts (e.g., sewing), but the organization primarily wanted the girlfriends of gang members
as an exploitative measure in which their presence could “win the confidence” of the young men
and help them get reformed.62 In Ferrick’s article, his description of the contents in the North
Philadelphia center demonstrated the financial difficulties the organization had: chairs, a few
“ancient desks,” a blackboard, a ping pong table, and a record player “that looks too old to
play.”63
In Speer’s article, he depicted the centers’ economic struggles in providing educational
resources for youth by describing how the staff at the West Philadelphia center (sharing a facility
with the Christian Young Life organization) were tutoring youth with thirty and forty-year-old
reading and math books as they patiently awaited the arrival of books donated by the Board of
Education. The centers offered meager success in employment for gang members because the
facilities did not provide adequate job training in vocational skills.64 Speer noted that while the
Philadelphia Tutorial Project offered study help to juveniles, the State Bureau of Employment
Security provided job counseling, despite its rare visits to the center. In fact, during the existence
of Safe Streets a Philadelphia mechanic who read in the newspaper about the organization
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volunteered to fund transportation to his shop so that he could teach youth from the centers his
trade.65
In August 1971, Willard Scott, a 66-year-old proprietor of an auto repair business since 1929,
heard about Safe Streets’ mission and called the DA’s Office requesting to train gang members
to be mechanics.66 Scott, not fully aware of the social conditions drifting some black youth into
gang activity was concerned about the senselessness of gang violence and how simple it could
partially be solved:
These black kids need jobs and a challenge. But they keep killing each other and tilling up the jails. I
know my own 16-year-old—he’s so crazy about hot-rod engines, he can’t get into trouble..Send me some
of those gang members. I’ve got a car business and I’ll teach them how to work on engines. If it works,
maybe we can get some of ‘em jobs.67

According to Safe Streets’ Executive Director Heywood Matthews, Scott was the first
businessman to volunteer a vocational training program for the cash-strapped organization. Scott
soon welcomed eight youth to his garage at 1501 N. 61st Street and was immediately impressed
by their work ethic: “I couldn’t believe how nice they were, how hard they’d work. I had ‘em
tearing down engines eight hours a day, learning the basics. They wouldn’t go across the street
for cigarettes without asking my permission.”68
Once Christmas 1971 arrived, six youth dropped the program because they could not afford
the bus fare and lunch required to participate. Safe Streets tried to procure a $40 a week
subsistence for the boys’ expenses, but the organization struggled to acquire the funds. Instead,
Scott, Reverend Marshall Shepard’s congregation at Mt. Olivet Tabernacle Church, and
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Reverend Joseph Whearty of Our Lady of Victory Church raised money to cover the costs.69 By
February 1, 1972, Scott accepted a class of ten gang members with the goal of getting them jobs
as mechanics after ten weeks of training at one of the 50 garages and service stations in his
community. The Philadelphia Evening Bulletin journalist covering the story about Scott’s
partnership with Safe Streets in March 1972 not only demonstrated how appealing and vital
vocational training was for gang members, but also concluded his article with a sharp critique of
the police state in America’s major cities: solving gang violence this way is a “bargain” in the
“era of $100 million police budgets.”70
Speer’s report on Safe Streets also cast doubt on the organization’s long-term success when
he suggested it had to successfully prove it could solve youth gang violence since it was “being
watched” by civic and law enforcement agencies. Safe Streets was not only concerned about
attendee retention at the centers, but also possible gang activity at night when the centers were
closed.71 Additionally, the lack of parental, community, and gang member support for the
organization troubled not only Speer, but also Unit Director Charles Fowler:
If the problem doesn’t hit them [parents] in their own parlor, they just don’t get concerned about it...If you
get the [gang] leader on your side, you got the whole gang with you...In many cases, the leader has more
power over the gang members than the boys’ parents...We want the boys to look beyond their present
situation. We want them to see that there is no future in being a gang member.72

Nevertheless, the staff at Safe Streets remained committed to their mission to reduce gang
violence, as voiced by Project Administrator Walter W. Cohen: “Our central aim is to stop
killing, but that is not our final aim—our final aim is to enable these kids to see the senselessness
of killing and to participate in normal activities.”73 Nine days after Ferrick’s article was
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published, the Philadelphia Evening Bulletin reported the LEAA allocated $150,000 for
“Philadelphia’s emergency juvenile gang control project.” Once Specter learned about the
allocation, he asked Senate Minority Leader Hugh Scott to expedite the funds since the
organization was in immediate need of them to continue operations.74 The City of Philadelphia
also received an LEAA grant (a month prior) in the amount of $80,267. Despite the brewing
competition Safe Streets had with the police department for funds, Specter reiterated the
significance of his program in a press release by stating his grant would be used to “increase job
opportunities, overcome functional illiteracy, and set up guidance group interaction techniques to
instill a more mature social responsible attitude and behavior pattern in juveniles.”75
In August 1970, the relationship between the black community and the police took a
nosedive when Police Commissioner Rizzo conflated black radicals with black criminals and
ordered the raid of multiple offices of the Black Panther Party (BPP) following the shootings of
four policemen in two days. On August 29, 1970, 39-year-old Park Policeman James Harrington
was sitting in his police wagon a hundred yards from the Cobbs Creek Guardhouse in West
Philadelphia when five black men from revolutionary group, the Black Unity Council, shot him
at point-blank range.76 The men then entered the guardhouse and shot 43-year-old Fairmount
Park Police Sergeant Frank Von Colln five times, murdering him as he sat at his desk.77 On the
night of August 30, 1970, twenty-five-year-old Patrolman Thomas J. Gibbons Jr. (the son of
former Police Commissioner Gibbons), and his partner, 28-year-old John J. Nolen were shot
after they stopped two black men in a stolen car in Southwest Philadelphia. After two days of
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anti-police violence from black men, Rizzo spoke to the media about both incidents. Following
Rizzo’s visit to Gibbons and Nolen at Misericordia Hospital, he told news reporters “this is no
longer a civilized neighborhood.”78 Rizzo then erroneously announced that the Panthers were
responsible for Sergeant Von Colln’s murder instead of the Black Unity Council.
Rizzo was already unhappy with the Black Panthers because, since 1966, the BPP’s goal for
black youth was to take a Marxist, black nationalist view and educate them on how institutional
racism, poverty, and police brutality damaged the black community.79 The Panthers’ pamphlet,
Ten-Point Program, outlined the goals the organization had for the community, which included
demanding the government provide full employment, decent housing, and education for black
people. In the BPP’s pamphlet, Eight Points of Attention, outlined moral principles for its
members to follow as role models in the black community, such as “do not hit or swear at
people,” “do not take liberties with women,” and “do not damage property of the oppressed
masses.” Additionally, the Panthers provided numerous missions programs to alleviate some of
the socioeconomic burdens lower-class blacks faced each day.80 These programs included a
community ambulance service, free medical and legal clinics, a police patrol (where Panthers
openly carried guns and followed police cars to preemptively prevent police brutality),
community centers, and the Free Breakfast for School Children Program.81 Since the Panthers
provided these free resources to impoverished blacks in the city, their political propaganda
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appealed to the black community because it identified institutional racism and the failure of
social welfare programs as causes for the struggles of the urban black poor.
In the early morning hours of August 31st, Rizzo assisted in 100 police marksmen raiding
two BPP offices in North and Northwest Philadelphia and the organization’s main headquarters
in West Philadelphia, even though a homicide detective already arrested the suspects involved in
the shootings of Officer Harrington and Sergeant Von Colln.82 The officers soon publicly strip
searched seven Panthers on a residential street, effectively humiliating them in front of onlookers
and news media. The image of several bare-chested, barefoot, or completely nude Panthers lined
up against a wall was captured by Daily News photographer, Elwood P. Smith, and later
distributed around the world by United Press International. In press conferences, Rizzo
responded to the incident unabashed:
This was an excellent job. They can hide weapons, grenades and so forth, in their clothing…We did nothing
wrong…Their feelings were hurt. The big Black Panthers with their trousers down…We had information from
infiltrators and informers and from the black community that they did have guns in there…Some black leaders spew
out. Why did they not speak out before? I didn’t hear them speak out when Von Colln was shot. As far as I’m
concerned, they can go wash their necks. 83

Furthermore, this incident not only demonstrated how black activists and criminal suspects were
negligently categorized as one threatening entity to police, but also how organizations promoting
alternative methods to solving the societal problems of urban life would be discredited publicly
by city officials who believed government spending on crime-fighting was more useful than
social programs meant to uplift citizens.
When Rizzo became mayor on January 3, 1972, he immediately began a crackdown on gangs
in the city. At the time, there were approximately 200 gangs in operation (with 96% of members
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being black males) and citizens and politicians alike were concerned that gang violence was
interfering with the everyday lives of Philadelphians.84 In communities deemed gang territory,
merchants had to close their businesses early, parents had to transport their children to and from
school, and residents often feared turf wars between rival gangs. There were even news reports
of innocent bystanders getting caught in the middle of gang crossfire, like 42-year-old Pearl
Cooper who was shot in the chest and arm as she travelled home from the grocery store.85
Ultimately, the goal of the crackdown was to enforce Pennsylvania’s law on the prohibition of
concealed deadly weapons while also invoking the city ordinance requiring citizens to register if
they wanted to carry a weapon in a public place.
Beginning on January 30, 1972, the city ran a two-week moratorium on the prosecution of
gang members who turned in their weapons at neighborhood firehouses with no questions asked.
Although some gang members refused to turn in their weapons for fear they would be disarmed
and vulnerable to rival gangs, the city recovered a total of 58 rifles and revolvers.86 Following
the moratorium, the city proposed mass arrests of gang members to expeditiously eliminate gang
activity. In reference to the police policy of “stop and frisk” for weapons, City Managing
Director Hillel S. Levinson was quoted as confirming the procedure as necessary action: “The
city is looking very seriously at gang activities. It is not going to accept them any longer.” 87
Rizzo himself was also quoted by the press for his “tough on crime” approach as mayor:
We know who they are. They're going to be stopped on the street by the police and we're going to talk to
them. They had better hope they don't have weapons on them. We are going to move against gangs and
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we are not going to take any stuff from them. If they want to fight hand‐to‐hand, we'll take them on.
That's the challenge.88

After the moratorium, the Confederation for the Conservation of Our City asked churches
and synagogues to be open 24 hours a day on the weekend of February 12-13, 1972 as
sanctuaries for gang members if mass arrests occurred. While the city proposed mass arrests,
local organizations like the West Philadelphia organization, Umoja, Inc. arranged peace talks
with about 500 gang members to avoid the crackdown.89 According to journalists, organizations
like this were in agreement with sociologists and gang members that the solution to gang activity
was adequate job training programs and jobs for unemployed, unskilled, high school dropouts.
From 1973 to 1974, gang violence decreased but the presence of gangs in Philadelphia was
still prevalent. By 1974, there were approximately 250 youth gangs in Philadelphia alone, with
membership for each gang ranging from 18 to 200 individuals between the ages of ten to twentytwo years old. According to police, gang activity was strongly active within the black
communities of North and West Philadelphia, leading city officials to concentrate more on
curbing crime in those neighborhoods.90 At Safe Streets the organization was in danger of being
shut down after it received a six-month evaluation and the Philadelphia Regional Planning
Council decided to discontinue disbursement of funds on December 31, 1974. Progress reports
were regularly sent to the Governor's Justice Commission where they were transferred to Keith
Miles at the Office of Evaluation, LEAA-NILECJ within the Department of Justice.91
In July 1974, an evaluation team from the historically-black college, Lincoln University
visited Safe Streets’ centers, conducted interviews with staff and juvenile attendees, reviewed the

88

Janson, “Gangs Face Drive in Philadelphia.”
Janson, “Gangs Face Drive in Philadelphia.”
90
Youth in Conflict Cooperative Service Project, Safe Streets, Inc. (Six Month Evaluation Report, July-December
1974), December 31, 1974.
91
Safe Streets, Inc. (Six Month Evaluation Report, July-December 1974).
89

26

program’s components, and requested records of operation to determine whether the organization
was impactful in ending gang violence in the city.92 Once their evaluation was complete, the
team determined that Safe Streets “tried to do too much for too many” and given its difficulties
with efficient record-keeping, sufficient and highly-experienced staff, and proper coordination
with the Youth Service Commission (YSC) that arranged training programs for juveniles, the
non-profit should close its doors and allow the program to “go on where it can until the new plan
is developed.”93
One of the main reasons for Safe Streets’ “failures” was financial support. The organization
had poor record-keeping because data on juveniles and program affairs were often handwritten
and these documents were only accessible to evaluators when staff had the time and means to
produce typewritten copies.94 The staff who ran the centers were often former gang members
who had neither a college education nor formal training in vocational skills or group therapy,
therefore the organization had to hire or solicit volunteers who were trained in the fields
necessary to meet the needs of juveniles. Additionally, staff at the centers were often paid low
wages and pressured to work long hours so that juveniles could remain at the centers all day,
instead of spending time on the streets where gang activity occurred.95 Lastly, poor recordkeeping and low morale among overworked staff members made program partnerships with the
YSC an extra burden.96 Although evaluators from Lincoln University believed the sports and
recreation programs for youth were sound, they “lacked coordination and were weak in social
service referral and follow up.”97 Nevertheless, while Safe Streets ideally wanted to end gang
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violence with the resources it provided, the organization did not have enough manpower or
finances to achieve its goals.
In November 1974, the Philadelphia Regional Planning Council disapproved Safe Streets’
funding application because they received poor evaluations from Lincoln University and
therefore saw no comprehensive planning to reduce gang activity from the organization’s current
efforts. Director of the Philadelphia Regional Council, Yvonne Haskins, later stated in a press
release the disapproval was because “funding for ineffective programs was wrong” and before
additional federal funds are spent, the city’s Youth Services Commission must “devise an
overall plan aimed at curbing gang violence.”98 Even though Safe Streets was scheduled to close
that December, officials attempted to win more funding for the program by petitioning multiple
politicians.99
On January 6, 1975, the Governor’s Justice Commission met in Harrisburg to consider
funding Safe Streets and two other low-performing social programs, the Intensive Area Youth
Workers and Youth Development, operated by the Philadelphia Public Welfare Department. At
the conclusion of the meeting, Safe Streets, having already received $942,165 in LEAA funds
over the years, was granted two more months to operate with $30,000 in federal subsidies. Initial
responses to the news of unexpected funding was mixed. Executive Director of Safe Streets,
Lewis Taylor Jr. responded with elation stating that the added funds would safeguard the
organization’s basketball, job counselling, vocational training, and educational programs for 400
youth because 27 staff workers would be retained. City Managing Director, Hillel Levinson
responded with a cautious sense of relief in that the three programs were crucial to curbing gang
activity on the community level because they were the only municipal entities outside of the
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police department that directly tackled gang issues: “to discontinue them would severely restrict
our ability to handle gangs other then by police action.”100 Unfortunately, the Intensive Area
Youth Workers and Youth Development were denied additional funding, a fate Safe Streets
hoped to avoid after its two-month extension ended.
Less than six months after Safe Streets won additional funding from the Governor’s Justice
Commission, the organization was in jeopardy again when the city’s budget for social programs
and the police department was under consideration by the Philadelphia Regional Planning
Council. On the evening of June 19, 1975, the council met at Midtown Holiday Inn to review
Safe Streets’ application for $217,496 in federal funds.101 The council criticized the organization
for continuously relying on LEAA grants and not searching for other financial supporters. The
council then denied Safe Streets’ application with an 8-7 vote, leaving the final decision on
funding to the Governor’s Justice Commission.102
At the same meeting, the council reviewed the city’s application for $1.04 million to install a
computerized police radio dispatching system for the police department. As early as August
1974, the city noticed a 16% increase in police calls and argued that this rise in police requests
left the department “overtaxed” and unable to respond quickly.”103 Believing rising crime rates
required advanced policing techniques to remedy the issue, city officials hired an independent
consultant who recommended the police department use a computer system to keep logs of 911
calls, the precise locations of callers, and the availability of police cars to arrive at crime scenes
or emergency situations. State criminal justice planner, Ted Shoemaker praised the approach,
stating that if Philadelphia carried out this plan it would be the “first in the country” to do so,

100

“Safe Streets Gang Control Gets $30,000.”
“Gang-Control Loses Bid for U.S. Aid,” Philadelphia Evening Bulletin, June 20, 1975.
102
“Gang-Control Loses Bid for U.S. Aid.”
103
“Gang-Control Loses Bid for U.S. Aid.”
101

29

especially since the city preferred a private consultant to set up the system rather than rely on
computer firms to simply supply the necessary equipment.104 Ultimately, the council approved
the city’s request to spend additional funds on policing.
Since June 1975, Safe Streets was constantly granted additional funding by the Governor’s
Justice Commission to stay open “temporarily,” but the organization always existed with the
threat of closure as it survived on an insufficient budget. Although city officials knew Safe
Streets was a financial failure, they believed the organization had a quasi-effective approach to
remedying gang activity, rising crime rates, and juvenile delinquency. In late August 1976, the
Board of Managers of the Philadelphia Youth Study Center wanted to send “troubled and castoff children” between the ages of nine and seventeen to temporary foster and group homes while
they awaited their hearings in Juvenile Court for minor criminal offenses.105 City officials,
believing that jail was an inappropriate institution for low-risk youth to await trial, considered
Safe Streets a potential facility to lodge at least six juveniles at each center overnight since its
mission was to rehabilitate and steer children from violence and crime.106 By December 1976,
the organization was finally forced to shutter its doors when its grants from the city and federal
governments were discontinued.
From 1970 to 1976, Philadelphia gradually spent more money funding the police, prisons and
the courts than it did on juvenile commitment and the Youth Study Center.107 In 1976,
approximately 89% of Philadelphia’s $236 million budget for fighting crime went to the police
department, prisons, and the courts. Programs committed to rehabilitating juvenile delinquents
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received only 3.7% of budgetary spending.108 In the late 1970s, Philadelphia’s economic issues
gave government officials like Mayor Rizzo more leeway to argue that unpoliced (black) crime
contributed to the city’s financial difficulties. Few factories remained in Philadelphia as many
companies moved their headquarters and production factories to the suburbs to reduce business
expenses and increase profit margins. As factories left cities, so did jobs. In the summer of 1977,
Philadelphia and South Jersey saw the disappearance of more than 11,900 jobs in construction,
factories, services, and government, resulting in the region’s unemployment rate teeter tottering
between 7.1 and 8.8%.109 Although 1,339,400 people were employed, and 447,300 new jobs
were created in August 1977, the increase in residents quitting the job search made citizens and
politicians alike cynical about the city’s economic future. From 1972-1977, Philadelphia
experienced depopulation when nearly 250,000 people moved out of the city.110 With
Philadelphia losing not only business, property, and sales taxes from job flight and white flight,
the city’s tax base was struggling to finance the public services of water, sewage, street paving,
street cleaning (including snow removal), street lighting, police, and fire services.111 Moreover,
conservative city officials like Rizzo thought it was more viable to curb crime with massive
funding for the police, prisons, and courts to quickly undo the job flight and depopulation issues
that plagued the Philadelphia.
Conclusion: The Legacy: North Philly Peace Park
If you go to 2201 W. Stewart Street, the former location of the North Philadelphia center of
Safe Streets, you will find a vacant lot. Interestingly, in that vacant area is the North Philly Peace
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Park, an organization established in 2012 by community activist Tommy Joshua. As in the era of
Safe Streets, the North Philly Peace Park is a safe space in the middle of gang territory. Children
and adults can enter the large patch of land knowing that in Sharswood weapons, drugs, trash,
and violence are prohibited. At the park, there is a community garden, wooden park benches, and
brightly-painted car tires as decoration and recreation for children. The volunteers who work
there tend to the garden, distribute free food to community residents in need, and sell trinkets and
apparel to raise money for community projects like a vocational school for neighborhood
children. Although, gang activity there has not dissipated and Safe Streets has been defunct for
over forty years, the mission of the organization still lives on in the North Philly Peace Park as
community residents and activists work to fulfill the goals that Specter and his board once
proposed.
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Figure 1: Philadelphia’s Population by Race, 1900-1980
Demographics Table of white and black populations in Philadelphia.
Census
Year

Total Population

White Population (Number African American/Black
and Percent)
Population (Number
and Percent)

1900

1,293,697

1,229,673 (95.1%)

62,613 (4.8%)

1910

1,549,008

1,463,371 (94.5%)

84,459 (5.5%)

1920

1,823,779

1,688,180 (92.6%)

134,229 (7.4%)

1930

1,950,961

1,728,806 (88.6%)

219,599 (11.3%)

1940

1,931,334

1,678,577 (86.9%)

250,880 (13.0%)

1950

2,071,605

1,692,637 (81.7%)

376,041 (18.2%)

1960

2,002,512

1,467,479 (73.3%)

529,240 (26.4%)

1970

1,948,609

1,278,717 (65.6%)

653,791 (33.6%)

1980

1,688,210

983,084 (58.2%)

638,878 (37.8%)
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Figure 2: Chart of Active, Sporadic, and Dormant Gangs in Philadelphia as of May 13,
1968 (Printed in Phineas M. Anderson’s The Gang Unit)
(Source: Gang Control Unit, Philadelphia Police Department)
Gang

Area

Foes

Members

Status

2-4 Counts

25th to 27th;
Passyunk-Snyder

Hill; P.J.'s

25

Sporadic

P.J.'s

25th to 27th;
Passyunk-Snyder
(Claims same
territory as 2-4
Counts)

2-4 Counts;
22nd &
Greenwich

30

Active

5th Street

3rd to 7th Street;
Federal to South

13th Street

45

Active

13th Street

9th to Broad Street;
Christian-South

All gangs in
South Phila.

60

Active

5th and Porter

4th to 6th Street;
Moore to Porter

7th Street

25

Sporadic

7th Street

Mifflin to Wolf; 5th 5th and Porter
to 8th Street

30

Active

15th and Clymer
Street

Broad to 17th;
Washington-South

13th Street

30

Active

19th and
Dorrance Street

19th to 20th Street;
Reed to Dickinson
Street

None at this
time

40

Sporadic

21st and Titan
Street

19th to 22nd Street; 13th Street
Reed-Washington
Avenue

20

Active

22nd and
22nd to 24th Street; Roads; P.J.’s
Greenwich Street Wharton-Watkins
Street

25

Active

22nd and South
Street

17th to 23rd Street;
Washington-South

45

Active

20th and
Carpenter Street

22nd to 25th Street; None at this
Washingtontime

20

Sporadic

13th Street

34

Carpenter Street
2-T-6

26th to 30th Street;
Wharton to Moore

Taylor Street;
P.J.'s

25

Sporadic

30th and Tasker
Street

26th to 33rd Street;
Morris to Reed
Street

Any gang
from outside
their area

30

Sporadic

Roads

25th to 30th Street;
Wharton to Grays
Ferry Avenue

13th Street;
Taylor Street

25

Active

Taylor Street

23rd to 25th Street;
Tasker to Federal
Street

Roads; 2-T-6

25

Sporadic

Wine

20th to 21st Street;
Christian to
Washington
Avenue

22nd and
South Street

20

Sporadic

20th Street

20th to 22nd Street; Have several
Gerritt to Watkins
corners but
will band
together

70

Active

10th and
Carpenter Street

10th to 9th Street;
Washington to
Christian Street

Any gang in
South Phila.

10

Sporadic

12th and Poplar

8th to 12th Street;
Green to Girard
Avenue

Moroccans;
12th and
Oxford

50

Active

T.G.O.’s

Broad to 13th
Street; Fairmount
to Parrish

12th and
Poplar

20

Sporadic

16th and
Wallace Street

Broad to 20th
Street; Fairmount
to Spring Garden
Street

Moroccans

20

Active

Moroccans

Broad to 20th
Street; Fairmount
to Girard Avenue

12th and
Poplar; 16th
and Seybert

75

Active

35

16th and
Dauphin

Broad to 18th
Street; Lehigh to
Susquehanna
Avenue

21st and Norris

21st and
Norris

30

Active

19th to 22nd Street; 16th and
Susquehanna to
Dauphin;
Berks Street
Valley

40

Active

28th and
Montgomery

24th to 27th Street;
Columbia to
Montgomery

50

Active

2-9-D’s

28th to 32nd Street; 30th and
Norris to York
Norris

30

Active

30th and Norris

30th to 33rd Street;
Susquehanna to
Montgomery

Valley; 32nd
and Turner;
28th and
Montgomery

30

Active

32nd and Turner

31st to 33rd Street;
Columbia to
Oxford

30th and
Norris

25

Active

L.T.’s

29th to 33rd Street;
Huntingdon to
Lehigh

Village

45

Dormant

Village

24th to 27th;
Dauphin to
Cumberland

L.T.’s

60

Sporadic

Valley

Broad to 26th
Street; Columbia to
Diamond Street

15th and
Oxford; 30th
and Norris

250

Active

15th and Oxford

Broad to 18th
Street; Columbia to
Jefferson Street

16th and
Montgomery;
21st and
Montgomery;
19th and
Montgomery

20

Active

DeMarco’s

20th to 25th Street;
Thompson to

21st and
Montgomery;

45

Active

Valley;
DeMarco’s;
28th and
Oxford; 30th
and Norris

36

Columbia Avenue

28th and
Oxford

19th and Harlan

18th to 20th Street;
Jefferson to
Columbia Avenue

Valley; 21st
and
Montgomery

30

Active

16th and Seybert

Broad to 18th
Street; Girard to
Jefferson Street

Moroccans;
12th and
Poplar

40

Active

2-4-R'S

24th to 25th Street;
Oxford to Jefferson

28th and
Oxford

25

Sporadic

28th and Oxford

22nd to 32nd
Street; Girard to
Oxford Street

DeMarco’s;
24th and
Redner

20

Active

M.M.F.

8th to Broad Street;
Lehigh to
Clearfield

Zulu Nation

30

Active

Camac and
Butler

10th to Broad
Street; Erie to
Hunting Park

None at this
time

20

Sporadic

Uptown Norris

6th to 10th Street;
Somerset to
Allegheny

None at this
time

50

Sporadic

8th and Diamond 6th to Broad Street;
Berks to York
Street

8th and
Oxford; Zulu
Nation

100

Active

8th and Oxford

5th to Broad Street;
Jefferson to Berks

8th and
Diamond;
12th and
Poplar

60

Active

Zulu Nation

Front to 7th Street;
Columbia to
Lehigh

M.M.F.; 8th
and Diamond

200

Active

Stars

2nd to 5th Street;
Diamond to
Huntingdon

None at this
time

50

Dormant

Soul Diplomats

2nd to 5th Street;

None at this

25

Sporadic

37

Diamond to
Huntingdon

time

Sommerville

Chew Avenue to
Dogtown;
21st Street; Chelten Haines Street
to Ogontz Avenue

200

Active

Dogtown

Gorgas Lane to
Walnut Lane;
Chew to
Germantown
Avenue

Sommerville;
Haines Street

75

Active

Pulaski Town

Queen Lane to
Chelten Avenue;
Pulaski to
Wissahickon
Avenue

Sommerville;
Haines Street

30

Dormant

Haines Street

Germantown
Avenue to Belfield
Ave.; Walnut Lane
to Chelten Avenue

Dogtown;
Sommerville;
Brickyard

60

Active

Brickyard

Penn to Logan
Haines Street
Street;
Germantown
Avenue to Rubicam
Street

40

Sporadic

Clang

68th Avenue to
65th Avenue;
Ogontz to Broad
Street

Sommerville

75

Active

15th and
Venango

Broad to 17th
Street; Erie to
Tioga Street

M.M.F.; 21st 35
and
Westmoreland

Active

23rd and
Atlantic

Hunting Park
Avenue to Ontario;
21st to 23rd Street

21st and
30
Westmoreland

Active

21st and
Westmoreland

Broad to 22nd
Street; Lehigh
Avenue to
Westmoreland

23rd and
Atlantic; 15th
and Venango

Active

38

50

39th and Aspen

39th to Union
Street; Aspen to
Brown

36th and
Market;
Empires; 41st
and Brown;
43rd and
Pennsgrove

35

Active

Theta Phi
Omicrons

33rd to 34th Street;
Haverford to
Mantua Avenue

36th and
Market

20

Active

36th and Market
(This gang
moved but still
carries the old
corner's name)

51st and Sansom

39th and
40
Aspen 34th
and Haverford

Active

Empires

35th to 36th Street;
Haverford to
Wallace

39th and
Aspen

20

Active

41st and Brown

41st Street Fairmount-Brown

39th and
Aspen

20

Active

43rd and
Pennsgrove

40th to 43rd;
Westminster to
Mantua Avenue

39th and
Aspen; June
and Parrish

15

Active

Coast

57th to 60th Street;
Spruce to Market
Street

Moons; Cedar
Avenue

30

Active

Cedar Avenue

55th to 57th Street;
Baltimore to Cedar

Coast; Creeks; 25
49th and
Woodland

Active

49th and
Woodland

48th to 50th Street;
Upland to Chester
Avenue

Cedar Avenue

Sporadic

60th and
Webster

59th to 60th Street;
Christian to Pine

Creeks; 49th
20
and Woodland

Active

Moons

58th to 63rd Street;
Market to Jefferson

Coast

50

Active

June and Parrish

June to 48th Street;
Parrish to Brown

43rd and
Pennsgrove

20

Dormant

39

30

Lansdowners

54th to 58th Street;
Lancaster to
Lansdowne

Moons

20

Sporadic

Creeks

61st to 63rd Street;
Cobbs Creek
Parkway to
Christian

Cedar
20
Avenue; Coast

Dormant

Figure 3: Chart of Additional Gangs in Philadelphia as of April 1970 (Printed in Phineas
M. Anderson’s The Gang Unit)
(Source: Youth Conservation Services, Philadelphia Welfare Department)
Gang

Area

Foes

Members

Status

31st and Reed

--

Unknown

Unknown

Unknown

20th and
Dickinson
Streets

--

Unknown

Unknown

Unknown

2-S-6

26th and South
Streets

Unknown

Unknown

Unknown

2-E-6

26th and Earp
Streets

Unknown

Unknown

Unknown

2-M-1

21st and Morris
Streets

Unknown

Unknown

Unknown

Hill Gang

31st and Mifflin
Streets

Unknown

Unknown

Unknown

Toppers

--

Unknown

Unknown

Unknown

Main Streeters

--

Unknown

Unknown

Unknown

Black Bridge

--

Unknown

Unknown

Unknown

Centaurs

--

Unknown

Unknown

Unknown

Counties

--

Unknown

Unknown

Unknown

CC Counts

--

Unknown

Unknown

Unknown

31st and
Montgomery

--

Unknown

Unknown

Unknown

40

Avenue
28th and Oxford
Streets

--

Unknown

Unknown

Unknown

31st and
Cumberland
Streets

--

Unknown

Unknown

Unknown

Cambria
Streeters

20th and
Cambria Streets

Unknown

Unknown

Unknown

Cool World
Valley

--

Unknown

Unknown

Unknown

58-W's

58th and
Willows

Unknown

Unknown

Unknown

Wallace
Streeters

12th and Wallace Unknown
Streets

Unknown

Unknown

Twine Debs of
Soul

Chelten and
Ardleigh Streets

Unknown

Unknown

Unknown

Da Nang Delta

Chelten and
Ardleigh Streets

Unknown

Unknown

Unknown

Black Volunteer
Society

13th and
Fitzwater Streets

Unknown

Unknown

Unknown

Last Siders

Roxborough

Unknown

Unknown

Unknown

32nd and
Haverford
Avenue

--

Unknown

Unknown

Unknown

58th and Whitby
Avenue

--

Unknown

Unknown

Unknown

58th and Chester
Avenue

--

Unknown

Unknown

Unknown

Mill Creek Area

--

Unknown

Unknown

Unknown

42nd and Mantua -Avenue (Girls)

Unknown

Unknown

Unknown

41

23rd and
Diamond Streets

--

Unknown

Unknown

Unknown

25th and
Diamond Streets

--

Unknown

Unknown

Unknown

Upsetters - 24th
and Master
(Girls)

--

Unknown

Unknown

Unknown

FishtownLutheran Center
Minis (Girls)

--

Unknown

Unknown

Unknown

FishtownLutheran Center
Minis (Boys)

--

Unknown

Unknown

Unknown

Venice Islanders

Northwest
Philadelphia

Unknown

Unknown

Unknown

Mayfair Area
(Boys)

Northwest
Philadelphia

Unknown

Unknown

Unknown

Mayfair Area
(Girls)

Northwest
Philadelphia

Unknown

Unknown

Unknown

3-T-0

South
Philadelphia

Unknown

Unknown

Unknown

7th and Morris
Streets

--

Unknown

Unknown

Unknown

2nd and Harps
Streets

--

Unknown

Unknown

Unknown

Hawthorne Area
(Girls)

--

Unknown

Unknown

Unknown

Wilson Park
(Girls)

--

Unknown

Unknown

Unknown

42

Figure 4: Philadelphia Spending to Fight Crime
(Source: Philadelphia Evening Bulletin, “Billions for Safe Streets Yield Failure, Fear, Fury,”
September 11, 1977.)
Purpose

Fiscal 1970

Fiscal 1976

Police

$80 million

$152.5 million

Prisons

8.6 million

18.1 million

Defender Association

1.2 million

3.2 million

Sheriff

1.9 million

3.6 million

District Attorney

2.2 million

6.0 million

Clerk of Courts

1.4 million

2.5 million

Courts

15.5 million

39.8 million

Youth Study Center

1.6 million

3.0 million

Juvenile Commitment

3.0 million

5.7 million

Citizens Crime Prevention -Total

1.6 million

$115.4 million 236 million

Figure 5: Pennsylvania Spending to Fight Crime
(Source: Philadelphia Evening Bulletin, “Millions for Safe Streets, and Crime Still Climbs,”
March 10, 1974.)
Year

Law
Enforcement

Corrections

Courts

Total

1969

$968,000

$349,000

$85,000

$1,427,000
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1970

$4,598,000

$2,778,000

$1,383,000

$10,590,000

1971

$6,757,000

$9,176,000

$2,286,000

$22,276,000

1972

$6,908,000

$12,112,000

$2,811,000

$26,469,000

1973

$9,512,000

$13,052,000

$3,724,000

$30,715,000

Figure 6: Gang Related Homicides in Philadelphia, 1965-1976
(Source: Philadelphia Evening Bulletin, May 23, 1976.)
Year

Number of Homicides

1962 1
1965 13
1966 14
1967 12
1968 30
1969 45
1970 30
1971 43
1972 39
1973 43
1974 32
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1975 15
1976 3
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